Bp History

BPs 2009 Annual Report contains details that SEEAC met seven times in 2009 and heard the IEs second annual shroud. It concluded that good move on was cosmos made, in particular that BPs tone at the top was reinforcing valuable affirmatory messages on the importance of process safety, that the Panels recommendations had become embedded in the planning and resource allocation processes at all U.S. refineries and that BPs gumshoe and Operations audit programme had matured into a comprehensive, high-quality programme. It is regrettable that this initiative didnt extend to all BP operations, including the highly encountery boring in deep water.

The extensive audit committee report showed 12 meetings in 2009 and a joint meeting with SEEAC. During the year, these committees employed with management, the general auditor, and other monitoring and assurance providers (such as the grouping compliance and ethics officer and the external auditor) on a regular basis to monitor the management of risks. The board is fit that appropriate remedial actions were taken or are being taken where significant failings or weaknesses in internal controls were place during the year.





With all of the seemingly goldplated risk management policies and procedures and extensive reverting efforts in place, the question arises, why didnt they work to prevent the gulf catastrophe? The answer may be because BPs actions on the Deepwater scene job seemed to emphasize cost control and speed to issue instead of safety. One BP engineer quoted in the Washington carry on June 14, 2010, called the doomed drilling rig a incubus well six days before the explosion. Despite the risk concerns set forth by various BP managers, decisions were made that didnt vomit up safety first--but instead recklessly allowed actions designed to save specie and finish the job as quickly as possibleIf you demand to get a full essay, order it on our website: Orderessay



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